Eric gets the most entertaining mail.
You have failed to comply with them after all the warning and instructions given to you, but since you are also among the terrorist we are facing in the country, I will personal make sure that I wipe away the crime in the state and I promise you that you will definitely pay with your life because I am here to protect the interest of my people and not to put them in shame, you suppose to support this government and not to spoil it.
Level 7 of the Stripe CTF involved running a length extension attack on the level 7 server's custom crypto code.
@app.route('/logs/')
@require_authentication
def logs(id):
rows = get_logs(id)
return render_template('logs.html', logs=rows)
...
def verify_signature(user_id, sig, raw_params):
# get secret token for user_id
try:
row = g.db.select_one('users', {'id': user_id})
except db.NotFound:
raise BadSignature('no such user_id')
secret = str(row['secret'])
h = hashlib.sha1()
h.update(secret + raw_params)
print 'computed signature', h.hexdigest(), 'for body', repr(raw_params)
if h.hexdigest() != sig:
raise BadSignature('signature does not match')
return True
The level 7 web app is a web API in which clients submit signed RESTful requests and some actions are restricted to particular clients. The goal is to view the response to one of the restricted actions. The first issue is that there is a logs path to display the previous requests for a user and although the logs path requires the client to be authenticatd, it doesn't restrict the logs you view to be for the user for which you are authenticated. So you can manually change the number in the '/logs/[#]' to '/logs/1' to view the logs for the user ID 1 who can make restricted requests. The level 7 web app can be exploited with replay attacks but you won't find in the logs any of the restricted requests we need to run for our goal. And we can't just modify the requests because they are signed.
However they are signed using their own custom signing code which can be exploited by a length extension attack. All Merkle–Damgård hash algorithms (which includes MD5, and SHA) have the property that if you hash data of the form (secret + data) where data is known and the length but not content of secret is known you can construct the hash for a new message (secret + data + padding + newdata) where newdata is whatever you like and padding is determined using newdata, data, and the length of secret. You can find a sha-padding.py script on VNSecurity blog that will tell you the new hash and padding per the above. With that I produced my new restricted request based on another user's previous request. The original request was the following.
count=10&lat=37.351&user_id=1&long=%2D119.827&waffle=eggo|sig:8dbd9dfa60ef3964b1ee0785a68760af8658048c
The new request with padding and my new content was the
following.
count=10&lat=37.351&user_id=1&long=%2D119.827&waffle=eggo%80%02%28&waffle=liege|sig:8dbd9dfa60ef3964b1ee0785a68760af8658048c
My new data in the new
request is able to overwrite the waffle parameter because their parser fills in a map without checking if the parameter existed previously.
Code review red flags included custom crypto looking code. However I am not a crypto expert and it was difficult for me to find the solution to this level.
Level 4 and level 6 of the Stripe CTF had solutions around XSS.
> Registered Users
<%= user[:username] %>
(password: <%= user[:password] %>, last active <%= last_active %>)
The level 4 web application lets you transfer karma to another user and in doing so you are also forced to expose your password to that user. The main user page displays a list of users who have transfered karma to you along with their password. The password is not HTML encoded so we can inject HTML into that user's browser. For instance, we could create an account with the following HTML as the password which will result in XSS with that HTML:
This HTML runs script that uses jQuery to post to the transfer URI resulting in a transfer of karma from the attacked user to the attacker user, and also the attacked user's
password.
Code review red flags in this case included lack of encoding when using user controlled content to create HTML content, storing passwords in plain text in the database, and displaying passwords generally. By design the web app shows users passwords which is a very bad idea.
...
def self.safe_insert(table, key_values)
key_values.each do |key, value|
# Just in case people try to exfiltrate
# level07-password-holder's password
if value.kind_of?(String) &&
(value.include?('"') || value.include?("'"))
raise "Value has unsafe characters"
end
end
conn[table].insert(key_values)
end
This web app does a much better job than the level 4 app with HTML injection. They use encoding whenever creating HTML using user controlled data, however they don't use encoding when injecting JSON data into script (see post_data initialization above). This JSON data is the last five most recent messages sent on the app so we get to inject script directly. However, the system also ensures that no strings we write contains single or double quotes so we can't get out of the string in the JSON data directly. As it turns out, HTML lets you jump out of a script block using no matter where you are in script. For instance, in the middle of a value in some JSON data we can jump out of script. But we still want to run script, so we can jump right back in. So the frame so far for the message we're going to post is the following:
I was the 546th person to complete Stripe's web security CTF and again had a ton of fun applying my theoretical knowledge of web security issues to the (semi-)real world. As I went through the levels I thought about what red flags jumped out at me (or should have) that I could apply to future code reviews:
Level | Issue | Code Review Red Flags |
---|---|---|
0 | Simple SQL injection | No encoding when constructing SQL command strings. Constructing SQL command strings instead of SQL API |
1 | extract($_GET); | No input validation. |
2 | Arbitrary PHP execution | No input validation. Allow file uploads. File permissions modification. |
3 | Advanced SQL injection | Constructing SQL command strings instead of SQL API. |
4 | HTML injection, XSS and CSRF | No encoding when constructing HTML. No CSRF counter measures. Passwords stored in plain text. Password displayed on site. |
5 | Pingback server doesn't need to opt-in | n/a - By design protocol issue. |
6 | Script injection and XSS | No encoding while constructing script. Deny list (of dangerous characters). Passwords stored in plain text. Password displayed on site. |
7 | Length extension attack | Custom crypto code. Constructing SQL command string instead of SQL API. |
8 | Side channel attack | Password handling code. Timing attack mitigation too clever. |
More about each level in the future.
During formalization of the WebFinger protocol [I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger], much discussion occurred regarding the appropriate URI scheme to include when specifying a user’s account as a web link [RFC5988].
…
acctURI = “acct:” userpart “@” domainpart
Use of my old Hotmail account has really snuck up on me as I end up caring more and more about all of the services with which it is associated. The last straw is Windows 8 login, but previous straws include Xbox, Zune, SkyDrive, and my Windows 7 Phone. I like the features and sync'ing associated with the Windows Live ID, but I don't like my old, spam filled, hotmail email address on the Live ID account.
A coworker told me about creating a Live ID from a custom domain, which sounded like just the ticket for me. Following the instructions above I was able to create a new deletethis.net Live ID but the next step of actually using this new Live ID was much more difficult. My first hope was there would be some way to link my new and old Live IDs so as to make them interchangeable. As it turns out there is a way to link Live IDs but all that does is make it easy to switch between accounts on Live Mail, SkyDrive and some other webpages.
Instead one must change over each service or start over depending on the service:
In Win8 you login with a Windows Live account. If you hook up a custom domain to a Live account you can login with that custom domain.
“From his first months in office, President Obamasecretly ordered increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America’s first sustained use of cyberweapons, according to participants in the program.”
Its all quite shocking.
Fourth , when I explained that the blog publisher had received music from the industry itself, a government attorney replied that authorization was an “affirmative defense” that need not be taken into account by the government in carrying out the seizure. That was stunning.
A House subcommittee has passed the Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA), which would require disclosure from companies about their human rights practices and limit the export of technologies that “serve the primary purpose of” facilitating government surveillance or censorship to countries designated as “Internet-restricting.”
First hand account of security researcher reporting security issues to Google and details on the security issues.
FTA:
The MPAA is getting pretty desperate, it seems. MPAA boss Chris Dodd was out trying to defend censoring the internet this week by using China as an example of why censorship isn’t a problem. It’s kind of shocking, really.
“When the Chinese told Google that they had to block sites or they couldn’t do [business] in their country, they managed to figure out how to block sites.”