Hmmm
“This rather embarrassing issue was pointed out to the committee, the fact that there were three votes too many, and that these three votes determined the outcome. When this was done, along with formally requesting a re-vote, that re-vote on the points in question was denied.”
Elaborating on a previous brief post on the topic of Web Worker initialization race conditions, there's two important points to avoid a race condition when setting up a Worker:
For example the following has no race becaues the spec guarentees that messages posted to a worker during its first synchronous block of execution will be queued and handled after that block. So the worker gets a chance to setup its onmessage handler. No race:
'parent.js':
var worker = new Worker();
worker.postMessage("initialize");
'worker.js':
onmessage = function(e) {
// ...
}
The following has a race because there's no guarentee that the parent's onmessage handler is setup before the worker executes postMessage. Race (violates 1):
'parent.js':
var worker = new Worker();
worker.onmessage = function(e) {
// ...
};
'worker.js':
postMessage("initialize");
The following has a race because the worker has no onmessage handler set in its first synchronous execution block and so the parent's postMessage may be sent before the worker sets its onmessage handler. Race (violates 2):
'parent.js':
var worker = new Worker();
worker.postMessage("initialize");
'worker.js':
setTimeout(
function() {
onmessage = function(e) {
// ...
}
},
0);
Most existing DRM attempts to only allow the user to access the DRM'ed content with particular applications or with particular credentials so that if the file is shared it won't be useful to others. A better solution is to encode any of the user's horrible secrets into unique versions of the DRM'ed content so that the user won't want to share it. Entangle the users and the content provider's secrets together in one document and accordingly their interests. I call this Blackmail DRM. For an implementation it is important to point out that the user's horrible secret doesn't need to be verified as accurate, but merely verified as believable.
Apparently I need to get these blog posts written faster because only recently I read about Social DRM which is a light weight version of my idea but with a misleading name. Instead of horrible secrets, they say they'll use personal information like the user's name in the DRM'ed content. More of my thoughts stolen and before I even had a chance to think of it first!
From the document: ‘Appendix B. Implementation Report: The encoding defined in this document currently is used for two different HTTP header fields: “Content-Disposition”, defined in [RFC6266], and “Link”, defined in [RFC5988]. As the encoding is a profile/clarification of the one defined in [RFC2231] in 1997, many user agents already supported it for use in “Content-Disposition” when [RFC5987] got published.
Since the publication of [RFC5987], two more popular desktop user agents have added support for this encoding; see http://purl.org/
NET/http/content-disposition-tests#encoding-2231-char for details. At this time, only one major
desktop user agent (Safari) does not support it.
Note that the implementation in Internet Explorer 9 does not support the ISO-8859-1 encoding; this document revision acknowledges that UTF-8 is sufficient for expressing all code points, and removes the requirement to support ISO-8859-1.’
Yay for UTF-8!
A bug came up the other day involving markup containing <input type="image" src="http://example.com/...
. I knew that "image" was a valid input type but it wasn't until that moment
that I realized I didn't know what it did. Looking it up I found that it displays the specified image and when the user clicks on the image, the form is submitted with an additional two name
value pairs: the x and y positions of the point at which the user clicked the image.
Take for example the following HTML:
<form action="http://example.com/">
<input type="image" name="foo" src="http://deletethis.net/dave/images/davebefore.jpg">
</form>
If the user
clicks on the image, the browser will submit the form with a URI like the following:http://example.com/?foo.x=145&foo.y=124
.
This seemed like an incredibly specific feature to be built directly into the language when this could instead be done with javascript. I looked a bit further and saw that its been in HTML since at least HTML2, which of course makes much more sense. Javascript barely existed at that point and sending off the user's click location in a form may have been the only way to do something interesting with that action.
CreateIUriBuilder(resolvedUri, 0, 0, &builder);
builder->SetHost(host);
builder->CreateUri(0xFFFFFFFF, 0, 0, &resolvedUri);
ResolveHost(resolvedUri, &resolvedUri);
operator T**()
{
T *ptrValue = mPtrValue;
mPtrValue->Release();
mPtrValue = NULL;
return &ptrValue;
}
I always have trouble remembering where the opt goes in SAL in the __deref_out case. The mnemonic is pretty simple: the _opt at the start of the SAL is for the pointer value at the start of the function. And the _opt at the end of the SAL is for the dereferenced pointer value at the end of the function.
SAL | foo == nullptr allowed at function start? | *foo == nullptr allowed at function end? |
---|---|---|
__deref_out void **foo | No | No |
__deref_opt_out void **foo | Yes | No |
__deref_out_opt void **foo | No | Yes |
__deref_opt_out_opt void **foo | Yes | Yes |