json - Dave's Blog

MSDN covers the topic of JavaScript and WinRT type conversions provided by Chakra (JavaScript Representation of Windows Runtime Types and Considerations when Using the Windows Runtime API), but for the questions I get about it I’ll try to lay out some specifics of that discussion more plainly. I’ve made a TL;DR JavaScript types and WinRT types summary table.

WinRT	Conversion	JavaScript
Struct	↔️	JavaScript object with matching property names
Class or interface instance	➡	JavaScript object with matching property names
Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet	➡	JavaScript object with arbitrary property names
Any	⃠	DOM object

Chakra, the JavaScript engine powering the Edge browser and JavaScript Windows Store apps, does the work to project WinRT into JavaScript. It is responsible for, among other things, converting back and forth between JavaScript types and WinRT types. Some basics are intuitive, like a JavaScript string is converted back and forth with WinRT’s string representation. For other basic types check out the MSDN links at the top of the page. For structs, interface instances, class instances, and objects things are more complicated.

A struct, class instance, or interface instance in WinRT is projected into JavaScript as a JavaScript object with corresponding property names and values. This JavaScript object representation of a WinRT type can be passed into other WinRT APIs that take the same underlying type as a parameter. This JavaScript object is special in that Chakra keeps a reference to the underlying WinRT object and so it can be reused with other WinRT APIs.

However, if you start with plain JavaScript objects and want to interact with WinRT APIs that take non-basic WinRT types, your options are less plentiful. You can use a plain JavaScript object as a WinRT struct, so long as the property names on the JavaScript object match the WinRT struct’s. Chakra will implicitly create an instance of the WinRT struct for you when you call a WinRT method that takes that WinRT struct as a parameter and fill in the WinRT struct’s values with the values from the corresponding properties on your JavaScript object.

// C# WinRT component
        public struct ExampleStruct
        {
            public string String;
            public int Int;
        }

        public sealed class ExampleStructContainer
        {
            ExampleStruct value;
            public void Set(ExampleStruct value)
            {
                this.value = value;
            }

            public ExampleStruct Get()
            {
                return this.value;
            }
        }

// JS code
        var structContainer = new ExampleWinRTComponent.ExampleNamespace.ExampleStructContainer();
        structContainer.set({ string: "abc", int: 123 });
        console.log("structContainer.get(): " + JSON.stringify(structContainer.get()));
        // structContainer.get(): {"string":"abc","int":123}

You cannot have a plain JavaScript object and use it as a WinRT class instance or WinRT interface instance. Chakra does not provide such a conversion even with ES6 classes.

You cannot take a JavaScript object with arbitrary property names that are unknown at compile time and don’t correspond to a specific WinRT struct and pass that into a WinRT method. If you need to do this, you have to write additional JavaScript code to explicitly convert your arbitrary JavaScript object into an array of property name and value pairs or something else that could be represented in WinRT.

However, the other direction you can do. An instance of a Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet implementation in WinRT is projected into JavaScript as a JavaScript object with property names and values corresponding to the key and value pairs in the IPropertySet. In this way you can project a WinRT object as a JavaScript object with arbitrary property names and types. But again, the reverse is not possible. Chakra will not convert an arbitrary JavaScript object into an IPropertySet.

// C# WinRT component
        public sealed class PropertySetContainer
        {
            private Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet otherValue = null;

            public Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet other
            {
                get
                {
                    return otherValue;
                }
                set
                {
                    otherValue = value;
                }
            }
        }

        public sealed class PropertySet : Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet
        {
            private IDictionary map = new Dictionary();

            public PropertySet()
            {
                map.Add("abc", "def");
                map.Add("ghi", "jkl");
                map.Add("mno", "pqr");
            }
            // ... rest of PropertySet implementation is simple wrapper around the map member.
            

// JS code
    var propertySet = new ExampleWinRTComponent.ExampleNamespace.PropertySet();
    console.log("propertySet: " + JSON.stringify(propertySet));
    // propertySet: {"abc":"def","ghi":"jkl","mno":"pqr"}

    var propertySetContainer = new ExampleWinRTComponent.ExampleNamespace.PropertySetContainer();
    propertySetContainer.other = propertySet;
    console.log("propertySetContainer.other: " + JSON.stringify(propertySetContainer.other));
    // propertySetContainer.other: {"abc":"def","ghi":"jkl","mno":"pqr"}

    try {
        propertySetContainer.other = { "123": "456", "789": "012" };
    }
    catch (e) {
        console.error("Error setting propertySetContainer.other: " + e);
        // Error setting propertySetContainer.other: TypeError: Type mismatch
}

There’s also no way to implicitly convert a DOM object into a WinRT type. If you want to write third party WinRT code that interacts with the DOM, you must do so indirectly and explicitly in JavaScript code that is interacting with your third party WinRT. You’ll have to extract the information you want from your DOM objects to pass into WinRT methods and similarly have to pass messages out from WinRT that say what actions the JavaScript should perform on the DOM.

Level 8 of the Stripe CTF is a password server that returns success: true if and only if the password provided matches the password stored directly via a RESTful API and optionally indirectly via a callback URI. The solution is side channel attack like a timing attack but with ports instead of time.

(I found this in my drafts folder and had intended to post a while ago.)

Code

    def nextServerCallback(self, data):
        parsed_data = json.loads(data)
        # Chunk was wrong!
        if not parsed_data['success']:
            # Defend against timing attacks
            remaining_time = self.expectedRemainingTime()
            self.log_info('Going to wait %s seconds before responding' %
                          remaining_time)
            reactor.callLater(remaining_time, self.sendResult, False)
            return

        self.checkNext()

Issue

The password server breaks the target password into four pieces and stores each on a different server. When a password request is sent to the main server it makes requests to the sub-servers for each part of the password request. It does this in series and if any part fails, then it stops midway through. Password requests may also be made with corresponding URI callbacks and after the server decides on the password makes an HTTP request on the provided URI callbacks saying if the password was success: true or false.
A timing attack looks at how long it took for a password to be rejected and longer times could mean a longer prefix of the password was correct allowing for a directed brute force attack. Timing attacks are prevented in this case by code on the password server that attempts to wait the same amount of time, even if the first sub-server responds with false. However, the server uses sequential outgoing port numbers shared between the requests to the sub-servers and the callback URIs. Accordingly, we can examine the port numbers on our callback URIs to direct a brute force attack.
If the password provided is totally incorrect then the password server will contact one sub-server and then your callback URI. So if you see the remote server's port number go up by two when requesting your callback URI, you know the password is totally incorrect. If by three then you know the first fourth of the password is correct and the rest is incorrect. If by four then two fourths of the password is correct. If by five then four sub-servers were contacted so you need to rely on the actual content of the callback URI request of 'success: true' or 'false' since you can't tell from the port change if the password was totally correct or not.
The trick in the real world is false positives. The port numbers are sequential over the system, so if the password server is the only thing making outgoing requests then its port numbers will also be sequential, however other things on the system can interrupt this. This means that the password server could contact three sub-servers and normally you'd see the port number increase by four, but really it could increase by four or more because of other things running on the system. To counteract this I ran in cycles: brute forcing the first fourth of the password and removing any entry that gets a two port increase and keeping all others. Eventually I could remove all but the correct first fourth of the password. And so on for the next parts of the password.
I wrote my app to brute force this in Python. This was my first time writing Python code so it is not pretty.

Level 4 and level 6 of the Stripe CTF had solutions around XSS.

Level 4

Code

> Registered Users 

<%@registered_users.each do |user| %>
<%last_active = user[:last_active].strftime('%H:%M:%S UTC') %>
<%if @trusts_me.include?(user[:username]) %>

• 
<%= user[:username] %>
(password: <%= user[:password] %>, last active <%= last_active %>)


Issue

The level 4 web application lets you transfer karma to another user and in doing so you are also forced to expose your password to that user. The main user page displays a list of users who have transfered karma to you along with their password. The password is not HTML encoded so we can inject HTML into that user's browser. For instance, we could create an account with the following HTML as the password which will result in XSS with that HTML:

This HTML runs script that uses jQuery to post to the transfer URI resulting in a transfer of karma from the attacked user to the attacker user, and also the attacked user's password.

Notes

Code review red flags in this case included lack of encoding when using user controlled content to create HTML content, storing passwords in plain text in the database, and displaying passwords generally. By design the web app shows users passwords which is a very bad idea.

Level 6

Code

...

    def self.safe_insert(table, key_values)
      key_values.each do |key, value|
        # Just in case people try to exfiltrate
        # level07-password-holder's password
        if value.kind_of?(String) &&
            (value.include?('"') || value.include?("'"))
          raise "Value has unsafe characters"
        end
      end

      conn[table].insert(key_values)
    end

Issue

This web app does a much better job than the level 4 app with HTML injection. They use encoding whenever creating HTML using user controlled data, however they don't use encoding when injecting JSON data into script (see post_data initialization above). This JSON data is the last five most recent messages sent on the app so we get to inject script directly. However, the system also ensures that no strings we write contains single or double quotes so we can't get out of the string in the JSON data directly. As it turns out, HTML lets you jump out of a script block using no matter where you are in script. For instance, in the middle of a value in some JSON data we can jump out of script. But we still want to run script, so we can jump right back in. So the frame so far for the message we're going to post is the following:

One of the more limiting issues of writing client side script in the browser is the same origin limitations of XMLHttpRequest. The latest version of all browsers support a subset of CORS to allow servers to opt-in particular resources for cross-domain access. Since IE8 there's XDomainRequest and in all other browsers (including IE10) there's XHR L2's cross-origin request features. But the vast majority of resources out on the web do not opt-in using CORS headers and so client side only web apps like a podcast player or a feed reader aren't doable.

One hack-y way around this I've found is to use YQL as a CORS proxy. YQL applies the CORS header to all its responses and among its features it allows a caller to request an arbitrary XML, HTML, or JSON resource. So my network helper script first attempts to access a URI directly using XDomainRequest if that exists and XMLHttpRequest otherwise. If that fails it then tries to use XDR or XHR to access the URI via YQL. I wrap my URIs in the following manner, where type is either "html", "xml", or "json":

        yqlRequest = function(uri, method, type, onComplete, onError) {
            var yqlUri = "http://query.yahooapis.com/v1/public/yql?q=" + 
                encodeURIComponent("SELECT * FROM " + type + ' where url="' + encodeURIComponent(uri) + '"');

            if (type == "html") {
                yqlUri += encodeURIComponent(" and xpath='/*'");
            }
            else if (type == "json") {
                yqlUri += "&callback=&format=json";
            }
            ...

This also means I can get JSON data itself without having to go through JSONP.