The GoBack and GoForward methods on the UWP WebView (x-ms-webview in HTML, Windows.UI.Xaml.Controls.WebView in XAML, and Windows.Web.UI.Interop.WebViewControl in Win32) act the same as the Back and Forward buttons in the Edge browser. They don't necessarily change the top level document of the WebView. If inside the webview an iframe navigates then that navigation will be recorded in the forward/back history and the GoBack / GoForward call may result in navigating that iframe. This makes sense as an end user using the Edge browser since if I click a link to navigate one place and then hit Back I expect to sort of undo that most recent navigation regardless of if that navigation happened in an iframe or the top level document.
If that doesn't make sense for your application and you want to navigate forward or back ignoring iframe navigates, unfortunately there's no perfect workaround.
One workaround could be to try calling GoBack and then checking if a FrameNavigationStarting event fires or a NavigationStarting event fires. If a frame navigates then try calling GoBack again. There could be async races in this case since other navigates could come in and send you the wrong signal and interrupt your multi step GoBack operation.
You could also try keeping track of all top level document navigations and manually navigate back to the URIs you care about. However, GoBack and GoForward also restore some amount of user state (form fills etc) in addition to navigating. Manually calling navigate will not give this same behavior.
On exploiting security issues in botnet C&C software:
Hackers “are learning that it’s not so easy to write secure code,” Toro says. “Most of us in the business of securing our applications and systems know that bulletproofing software is an extremely expensive and exhaustive undertaking. Malware creators who have to look to their own defences would have to slow down the production of new attacks.”
FYI, if you want to know what it looks like when you hack a hacker, look no further than the seminal 1995 film Hackers.
Some time back while I was working on getting the Javascript Windows Store app platform running on Windows Phone (now available on the last Windows Phone release!) I had an interesting bug that in retrospect is amusing.
I had just finished a work item to get accessibility working for JS WinPhone apps when I got a new bug: With some set of JS apps, accessibility appeared to be totally broken. At that time in development the only mechanism we had to test accessibility was a test tool that runs on the PC, connects to the phone, and dumps out the accessibility tree of whatever app is running on the phone. In this bug, the tool would spin for a while and then timeout with an error and no accessibility information.
My first thought was this was an issue in my new accessibility code. However, debugging with breakpoints on my code I could see none of my code was run nor the code that should call it. The code that called that code was a more generic messaging system that hit my breakpoints constantly.
Rather than trying to work backward from the failure point, I decided to try and narrow down the repro and work forwards from there. One thing all the apps with the bug had in common was their usage of WinJS, but not all WinJS apps demonstrated the issue. Using a binary search approach on one such app I removed unrelated app code until all that was left was the app's usage of the WinJS AppBar and the bug still occurred. I replaced the WinJS AppBar usage with direct usage of the underlying AppBar WinRT APIs and continued.
Only some calls to the AppBar WinRT object produced the issue:
var appBar = Windows.UI.WebUI.Core.WebUICommandBar.getForCurrentView();
// appBar.opacity = 1;
// appBar.closeDisplayMode = Windows.UI.WebUI.Core.WebUICommandBarClosedDisplayMode.default;
appBar.backgroundColor = Windows.UI.Colors.white; // Bug!
Just
setting the background color appeared to cause the issue and I didn't even have to display the AppBar. Through additional trial and error I was blown away to discover that some colors I would set
caused the issue and other colors did not. Black wouldn't cause the issue but transparent black would. So would aqua but not white.
I eventually realized that predefined WinRT color values like Windows.UI.Colors.aqua would cause the issue while JS literal based colors didn't cause the issue (Windows.UI.Color is a WinRT struct which projects in JS as a JS literal object with the struct members as JS
object properties so its easy to write something like {r: 0, g: 0, b: 0, a: 0}
to make a color) and I had been mixing both in my tests without realizing there would be a difference.
I debugged into the backgroundColor property setter that consumed the WinRT color struct to see what was different between Windows.UI.Colors.black and {a: 1, r: 0, g: 0, b: 0}
and
found the two structs to be byte wise exactly the same.
On a hunch I tried my test app with only a reference to the color and otherwise no interaction with the AppBar and not doing anything with the actual reference to the color:
Windows.UI.Colors.black;
. This too caused the issue. I knew that the implementation for these WinRT const values live in a DLL and guessed that something in the code to create these
predefined colors was causing the issue. I debugged in and no luck. Now I also have experienced crusty code that would do exciting things in its DllMain, the function that's called when a DLL is loaded into the process so I tried modifying my
C++ code to simply LoadLibrary the DLL containing the WinRT color definition, windows.ui.xaml.dll and found the bug still occurred! A short lived moment of relief as the world seemed to make
sense again.
Debugging into DllMain nothing interesting happened. There were interesting calls in there to be sure, but all of them behind conditions that were false. I was again stumped. On another hunch I tried renaming the DLL and only LoadLibrary'ing it and the bug went away. I took a different DLL renamed it windows.ui.xaml.dll and tried LoadLibrary'ing that and the bug came back. Just the name of the DLL was causing the issue.
I searched for the DLL name in our source code index and found hits in the accessibility tool. Grinning I opened the source to find that the accessibility tool's phone side service was trying to determine if a process belonged to a XAML app or not because XAML apps had a different accessibility contract. It did this by checking to see if windows.ui.xaml.dll was loaded in the target process.
At this point I got to fix my main issue and open several new bugs for the variety of problems I had just run into. This is a how to on writing software that is difficult to debug.
WinRT (JS and
C++)
|
JS Only
|
C++ Only
|
.NET Only
|
|
Parse
|
|
|||
Build
|
||||
Normalize
|
||||
Equality
|
|
|
||
Relative
resolution
|
||||
Encode data for
including in URI property
|
||||
Decode data extracted
from URI property
|
||||
Build Query
|
||||
Parse Query
|
What It All Means: All Your Communications are Belong to U.S. In sum, if you use encryption they’ll keep your data forever. If you use Tor, they’ll keep your data for at least five years. If an American talks with someone outside the US, they’ll keep your data for five years. If you’re talking to your attorney, you don’t have any sense of privacy. And the NSA can hand over you information to the FBI for evidence of any crime, not just terrorism. All without a warrant or even a specific FISA order.
Not sure if this is saying all Tor data is collected or saying if someone uses Tor then start collecting that someone’s communication.
Level 4 and level 6 of the Stripe CTF had solutions around XSS.
> Registered Users
<%= user[:username] %>
(password: <%= user[:password] %>, last active <%= last_active %>)
The level 4 web application lets you transfer karma to another user and in doing so you are also forced to expose your password to that user. The main user page displays a list of users who have transfered karma to you along with their password. The password is not HTML encoded so we can inject HTML into that user's browser. For instance, we could create an account with the following HTML as the password which will result in XSS with that HTML:
This HTML runs script that uses jQuery to post to the transfer URI resulting in a transfer of karma from the attacked user to the attacker user, and also the attacked user's
password.
Code review red flags in this case included lack of encoding when using user controlled content to create HTML content, storing passwords in plain text in the database, and displaying passwords generally. By design the web app shows users passwords which is a very bad idea.
...
def self.safe_insert(table, key_values)
key_values.each do |key, value|
# Just in case people try to exfiltrate
# level07-password-holder's password
if value.kind_of?(String) &&
(value.include?('"') || value.include?("'"))
raise "Value has unsafe characters"
end
end
conn[table].insert(key_values)
end
This web app does a much better job than the level 4 app with HTML injection. They use encoding whenever creating HTML using user controlled data, however they don't use encoding when injecting JSON data into script (see post_data initialization above). This JSON data is the last five most recent messages sent on the app so we get to inject script directly. However, the system also ensures that no strings we write contains single or double quotes so we can't get out of the string in the JSON data directly. As it turns out, HTML lets you jump out of a script block using no matter where you are in script. For instance, in the middle of a value in some JSON data we can jump out of script. But we still want to run script, so we can jump right back in. So the frame so far for the message we're going to post is the following:
A bug came up the other day involving markup containing <input type="image" src="http://example.com/...
. I knew that "image" was a valid input type but it wasn't until that moment
that I realized I didn't know what it did. Looking it up I found that it displays the specified image and when the user clicks on the image, the form is submitted with an additional two name
value pairs: the x and y positions of the point at which the user clicked the image.
Take for example the following HTML:
<form action="http://example.com/">
<input type="image" name="foo" src="http://deletethis.net/dave/images/davebefore.jpg">
</form>
If the user
clicks on the image, the browser will submit the form with a URI like the following:http://example.com/?foo.x=145&foo.y=124
.
This seemed like an incredibly specific feature to be built directly into the language when this could instead be done with javascript. I looked a bit further and saw that its been in HTML since at least HTML2, which of course makes much more sense. Javascript barely existed at that point and sending off the user's click location in a form may have been the only way to do something interesting with that action.
It was relatively easy, although still more difficult than I would have guessed, to hook my bespoke website's Atom feed up to Google Buzz. I already have a Google email account and associated profile so Buzz just showed up in my Gmail interface. Setting it up it offered to connect to my YouTube account or my Google Chat account but I didn't see an option to connect to an arbitrary RSS or Atom feed like I expected.
But of course hooking up an arbitrary Atom or RSS feed is documented. You hook it up in the same manner you claim a website as your own via the Google Profile (for some reason they want to ensure you own the feed connected to your Buzz account). You do this via Google's social graph API which uses XFN or FOAF. I used XFN by simply adding a link to my feed to my Google profile (And be sure to check the 'This is a profile page about me' which ensures that a rel="me" tag is added to the HTML on your profile. This is how XFN works.) And by adding a corresponding link in my feed back to my Google profile page with the following:
atom:link rel="me" href="http://www.google.com/profiles/david.risney"
I used this Google tool to check my XFN
connections and when I checked back the next day my feed showed up in Google Buzz's configuration dialog.
So more difficult than I would have expected (more difficult than just an 'Add your feed' button and textbox) but not super difficult. And yet after reading this Buzz from DeWitt Clinton I feel better about opting-in to Google's Social API.
PowerShell gives us a real CLI for Windows based around .Net stuff. I don't like the creation of a new shell language but I suppose it makes sense given that they want something C# like but not C# exactly since that's much to verbose and strict for a CLI. One of the functions you can override is the TabExpansion function which is used when you tab complete commands. I really like this and so I've added on to the standard implementation to support replacing a variable name with its value, tab completion of available commands, previous command history, and drive names (there not restricted to just one letter in PS).
Learning the new language was a bit of a chore but MSDN helped. A couple of things to note, a statement that has a return value that you don't do anything with is implicitly the return value for the current function. That's why there's no explicit return's in my TabExpansion function. Also, if you're TabExpansion function fails or returns nothing then the builtin TabExpansion function runs which does just filenames. This is why you can see that the standard TabExpansion function doesn't handle normal filenames: it does extra stuff (like method and property completion on variables that represent .Net objects) but if there's no fancy extra stuff to be done it lets the builtin one take a crack.
Here's my TabExpansion function. Probably has bugs, so watch out!
function EscapePath([string] $path, [string] $original)
{
if ($path.Contains(' ') -and !$original.Contains(' '))
{
'"' $path '"';
}
else
{
$path;
}
}
function PathRelativeTo($pathDest, $pathCurrent)
{
if ($pathDest.PSParentPath.ToString().EndsWith($pathCurrent.Path))
{
'.\' $pathDest.name;
}
else
{
$pathDest.FullName;
}
}
# This is the default function to use for tab expansion. It handles simple
# member expansion on variables, variable name expansion and parameter completion
# on commands. It doesn't understand strings so strings containing ; | ( or { may
# cause expansion to fail.
function TabExpansion($line, $lastWord)
{
switch -regex ($lastWord)
{
# Handle property and method expansion...
'(^.*)(\$(\w|\.) )\.(\w*)$' {
$method = [Management.Automation.PSMemberTypes] `
'Method,CodeMethod,ScriptMethod,ParameterizedProperty'
$base = $matches[1]
$expression = $matches[2]
Invoke-Expression ('$val=' $expression)
$pat = $matches[4] '*'
Get-Member -inputobject $val $pat | sort membertype,name |
where { $_.name -notmatch '^[gs]et_'} |
foreach {
if ($_.MemberType -band $method)
{
# Return a method...
$base $expression '.' $_.name '('
}
else {
# Return a property...
$base $expression '.' $_.name
}
}
break;
}
# Handle variable name expansion...
'(^.*\$)([\w\:]*)$' {
$prefix = $matches[1]
$varName = $matches[2]
foreach ($v in Get-Childitem ('variable:' $varName '*'))
{
if ($v.name -eq $varName)
{
$v.value
}
else
{
$prefix $v.name
}
}
break;
}
# Do completion on parameters...
'^-([\w0-9]*)' {
$pat = $matches[1] '*'
# extract the command name from the string
# first split the string into statements and pipeline elements
# This doesn't handle strings however.
$cmdlet = [regex]::Split($line, '[|;]')[-1]
# Extract the trailing unclosed block e.g. ls | foreach { cp
if ($cmdlet -match '\{([^\{\}]*)$')
{
$cmdlet = $matches[1]
}
# Extract the longest unclosed parenthetical expression...
if ($cmdlet -match '\(([^()]*)$')
{
$cmdlet = $matches[1]
}
# take the first space separated token of the remaining string
# as the command to look up. Trim any leading or trailing spaces
# so you don't get leading empty elements.
$cmdlet = $cmdlet.Trim().Split()[0]
# now get the info object for it...
$cmdlet = @(Get-Command -type 'cmdlet,alias' $cmdlet)[0]
# loop resolving aliases...
while ($cmdlet.CommandType -eq 'alias') {
$cmdlet = @(Get-Command -type 'cmdlet,alias' $cmdlet.Definition)[0]
}
# expand the parameter sets and emit the matching elements
foreach ($n in $cmdlet.ParameterSets | Select-Object -expand parameters)
{
$n = $n.name
if ($n -like $pat) { '-' $n }
}
break;
}
default {
$varNameStar = $lastWord '*';
foreach ($n in @(Get-Childitem $varNameStar))
{
$name = PathRelativeTo ($n) ($PWD);
if ($n.PSIsContainer)
{
EscapePath ($name '\') ($lastWord);
}
else
{
EscapePath ($name) ($lastWord);
}
}
if (!$varNameStar.Contains('\'))
{
foreach ($n in @(Get-Command $varNameStar))
{
if ($n.CommandType.ToString().Equals('Application'))
{
foreach ($ext in @((cat Env:PathExt).Split(';')))
{
if ($n.Path.ToString().ToLower().EndsWith(($ext).ToString().ToLower()))
{
EscapePath($n.Path) ($lastWord);
}
}
}
else
{
EscapePath($n.Name) ($lastWord);
}
}
foreach ($n in @(Get-psdrive $varNameStar))
{
EscapePath($n.name ":") ($lastWord);
}
}
foreach ($n in @(Get-History))
{
if ($n.CommandLine.StartsWith($line) -and $n.CommandLine -ne $line)
{
$lastWord $n.CommandLine.Substring($line.Length);
}
}
# Add the original string to the end of the expansion list.
$lastWord;
break;
}
}
}