There's no perfect way to change the user agent string for the UWP WebView (x-ms-webview in HTML, Windows.UI.Xaml.Controls.WebView in XAML, and Windows.Web.UI.Interop.WebViewControl in Win32) but there are two imperfect methods folks end up using.

The first is to call UrlMkSetSessionOption. This is an old public API that allows you to configure various arcane options including one that is the default user agent string for requests running through urlmon. This API is allowed by the Microsoft Store for UWP apps. The change it applies is process wide which has two potential drawbacks. If you want to be able to have different UA strings set for different requests from a WebView that's not really possible with this solution. The other drawback is if you're using out of process WebView, you need to ensure you're calling into UrlMkSetSessionOption in the WebView's process. You'll need to write third party WinRT that calls UrlMkSetSessionOption, create the out of proc WebView, navigate it to some trusted local page, use AddWebAllowedObject or provide that URI WinRT access, and call into your third party WinRT. You'll need to do that for any new WebView process you create.

The second less generally applicable solution is to use NavigateWithHttpRequestMessage and set the User-Agent HTTP header. In this case you get to control the scope of the user agent string changes but has the limitations that not all sub resource downloads will use this user agent string and for navigations you don't initiate you have to manually intercept and re-request being careful to transfer over all POST body state and HTTP headers correctly. That last part is not actually possible for iframes.

The x-ms-webview HTML element has the void addWebAllowedObject(string name, any value) method and the webview XAML element has the void AddWebAllowedObject(String name, Object value) method. The object parameter is projected into the webview’s top-level HTML document’s script engine as a new property on the global object with property name set to the name parameter. It is not injected into the current document but rather it is projected during initialization of the next top-level HTML document to which the webview navigates.

Lifetime

If AddWebAllowedObject is called during a NavigationStarting event handler the object will be injected into the document resulting from the navigation corresponding to that event.

If AddWebAllowedObject is called outside of the NavigationStarting event handler it will apply to the navigation corresponding to the next explicit navigate method called on the webview or the navigation corresponding to the next NavigationStarting event handler that fires, whichever comes first.

To avoid this potential race, you should use AddWebAllowedObject in one of two ways: 1. During a NavigationStarting event handler, 2. Before calling a Navigate method and without returning to the main loop.

If called both before calling a navigate method and in the NavigationStarting event handler then the result is the aggregate of all those calls.

If called multiple times for the same document with the same name the last call wins and the previous are silently ignored.

If AddWebAllowedObject is called for a navigation and that navigation fails or redirects to a different URI, the AddWebAllowedObject call is silently ignored.

After successfully adding an object to a document, the object will no longer be projected once a navigation to a new document occurs.

WinRT access

If AddWebAllowedObject is called for a document with All WinRT access then projection will succeed and the object will be added.

If AddWebAllowedObject is called for a document which has a URI which has no declared WinRT access via ApplicationContentUriRules then Allow for web only WinRT access is given to that document.

If the document has Allow for web only WinRT access then projection will succeed only if the object’s runtimeclass has the Windows.Foundation.Metadata.AllowForWeb metadata attribute.

Object requirements

The object must implement the IAgileObject interface. Because the XAML and HTML webview elements run on ASTA view threads and the webview’s content’s JavaScript thread runs on another ASTA thread a developer should not create their non-agile runtimeclass on the view thread. To encourage end developers to do this correctly we require the object implements IAgileObject.

Property name

The name parameter must be a valid JavaScript property name, otherwise the call will fail silently. If the name is already a property name on the global object, that property is overwritten if the property is configurable. Non-configurable properties on the global object are not overwritten and the AddWebAllowedObject call fails silently. On success, the projected property is writable, configurable, and enumerable.

Errors

Some errors as described above fail silently. Other issues, such as lack of IAgileObject or lack of the AllowForWeb attribute result in an error in the JavaScript developer console.

Application Content URI Rules (ACUR from now on) defines the bounds of the web that make up the Microsoft Store application. Package content via the ms-appx URI scheme is automatically considered part of the app. But if you have content on the web via http or https you can use ACUR to declare to Windows that those URIs are also part of your application. When your app navigates to URIs on the web those URIs will be matched against the ACUR to determine if they are part of your app or not. The documentation for how matching is done on the wildcard URIs in the ACUR Rule elements is not very helpful on MSDN so here are some notes.

Rules

You can have up to 100 Rule XML elements per ApplicationContentUriRules element. Each has a Match attribute that can be up to 2084 characters long. The content of the Match attribute is parsed with CreateUri and when matching against URIs on the web additional wildcard processing is performed. I’ll call the URI from the ACUR Rule the rule URI and the URI we compare it to found during app navigation the navigation URI.

The rule URI is matched to a navigation URI by URI component: scheme, username, password, host, port, path, query, and fragment. If a component does not exist on the rule URI then it matches any value of that component in the navigation URI. For example, a rule URI with no fragment will match a navigation URI with no fragment, with an empty string fragment, or a fragment with any value in it.

Asterisk

Each component except the port may have up to 8 asterisks. Two asterisks in a row counts as an escape and will match 1 literal asterisk. For scheme, username, password, query and fragment the asterisk matches whatever it can within the component.

Host

For the host, if the host consists of exactly one single asterisk then it matches anything. Otherwise an asterisk in a host only matches within its domain name label. For example, http://*.example.com will match http://a.example.com/ but not http://b.a.example.com/ or http://example.com/. And http://*/ will match http://example.com, http://a.example.com/, and http://b.a.example.com/. However the Store places restrictions on submitting apps that use the http://* rule or rules with an asterisk in the second effective domain name label. For example, http://*.com is also restricted for Store submission.

Path

For the path, an asterisk matches within the path segment. For example, http://example.com/a/*/c will match http://example.com/a/b/c and http://example.com/a//c but not http://example.com/a/b/b/c or http://example.com/a/c

Additionally for the path, if the path ends with a slash then it matches any path that starts with that same path. For example, http://example.com/a/ will match http://example.com/a/b and http://example.com/a/b/c/d/e/, but not http://example.com/b/.

If the path doesn’t end with a slash then there is no suffix matching performed. For example, http://example.com/a will match only http://example.com/a and no URIs with a different path.

As a part of parsing the rule URI and the navigation URI, CreateUri will perform URI normalization and so the hostname and scheme will be made lower case (casing matters in all other parts of the URI and case sensitive comparisons will be performed), IDN normalization will be performed, ‘.’ and ‘..’ path segments will be resolved and other normalizations as described in the CreateUri documentation.

You can use conditional breakpoints and debugging commands in windbg and cdb that together can amount to effectively patching a binary at runtime. This can be useful if you have symbols but you can't easily rebuild the binary. Or if the patch is small and the binary requires a great deal of time to rebuild.

Skipping code

If you want to skip a chunk of code you can set a breakpoint at the start address of the code to skip and set the breakpoint's command to change the instruction pointer register to point to the address at the end of the code to skip and go. Voila you're skipping over that code now. For example:

bp 0x6dd6879b "r @eip=0x6dd687c3 ; g"

Changing parameters

You may want to modify parameters or variables and this is simple of course. In the following example a conditional breakpoint ANDs out a bit from dwFlags. Now when we run its as if no one is passing in that flag.

bp wiwi!RelativeCrack "?? dwFlags &= 0xFDFFFFFF;g"

Slightly more difficult is to modify string values. If the new string length is the same size or smaller than the previous, you may be able to modify the string value in place. But if the string is longer or the string memory isn't writable, you'll need a new chunk of memory into which to write your new string. You can use .dvalloc to allocate some memory and ezu to write a string into the newly allocated memory. In the following example I then overwrite the register containing the parameter I want to modify:

.dvalloc 100
ezu 000002a9`d4eb0000 "mfcore.dll"
r rcx = 000002a9`d4eb0000

Calling functions

You can also use .call to actually make new calls to methods or functions. Read more about that on the Old New Thing: Stupid debugger tricks: Calling functions and methods. Again, all of this can be used in a breakpoint command to effectively patch a binary.

I've made a Unicode Clock in JavaScript.

Unicode has code points for all 30 minute increments of clock faces. This is a simple project to display the one closest to the current time written in JavaScript.

Because the code points are all above 0xFFFF, I make use of some ES6 additions. I use the \u{XXXXXX} style escape sequence since the old style JavaScript escape sequence \uXXXX only supports code points up to 0xFFFF. I also use the method String.codePointAt rather than String.charCodeAt because the code points larger than 0xFFFF are represented in JavaScript strings using surrogate pairs and charCodeAt gives the surrogate value rather than codePointAt which gives the code point represented by the pair of surrogates.

"🕛".codePointAt(0)
128347
"🕛".charCodeAt(0)
55357

🕐🕑🕒🕓🕔🕕🕖🕗🕘🕙🕚🕛🕜🕝🕞🕟🕠🕡🕢🕣🕤🕥🕦🕧

The ordering of the code points does not make it simple to do this. I initially guessed the first code point in the range would be 12:00 followed by 12:30, 1:00 and so on. But actually 1:00 is first followed by all the on the hour times then all the half hour times.

MSDN covers the topic of JavaScript and WinRT type conversions provided by Chakra (JavaScript Representation of Windows Runtime Types and Considerations when Using the Windows Runtime API), but for the questions I get about it I’ll try to lay out some specifics of that discussion more plainly. I’ve made a TL;DR JavaScript types and WinRT types summary table.

Chakra, the JavaScript engine powering the Edge browser and JavaScript Windows Store apps, does the work to project WinRT into JavaScript. It is responsible for, among other things, converting back and forth between JavaScript types and WinRT types. Some basics are intuitive, like a JavaScript string is converted back and forth with WinRT’s string representation. For other basic types check out the MSDN links at the top of the page. For structs, interface instances, class instances, and objects things are more complicated.

A struct, class instance, or interface instance in WinRT is projected into JavaScript as a JavaScript object with corresponding property names and values. This JavaScript object representation of a WinRT type can be passed into other WinRT APIs that take the same underlying type as a parameter. This JavaScript object is special in that Chakra keeps a reference to the underlying WinRT object and so it can be reused with other WinRT APIs.

However, if you start with plain JavaScript objects and want to interact with WinRT APIs that take non-basic WinRT types, your options are less plentiful. You can use a plain JavaScript object as a WinRT struct, so long as the property names on the JavaScript object match the WinRT struct’s. Chakra will implicitly create an instance of the WinRT struct for you when you call a WinRT method that takes that WinRT struct as a parameter and fill in the WinRT struct’s values with the values from the corresponding properties on your JavaScript object.

// C# WinRT component
        public struct ExampleStruct
        {
            public string String;
            public int Int;
        }

        public sealed class ExampleStructContainer
        {
            ExampleStruct value;
            public void Set(ExampleStruct value)
            {
                this.value = value;
            }

            public ExampleStruct Get()
            {
                return this.value;
            }
        }

// JS code
        var structContainer = new ExampleWinRTComponent.ExampleNamespace.ExampleStructContainer();
        structContainer.set({ string: "abc", int: 123 });
        console.log("structContainer.get(): " + JSON.stringify(structContainer.get()));
        // structContainer.get(): {"string":"abc","int":123}

You cannot have a plain JavaScript object and use it as a WinRT class instance or WinRT interface instance. Chakra does not provide such a conversion even with ES6 classes.

You cannot take a JavaScript object with arbitrary property names that are unknown at compile time and don’t correspond to a specific WinRT struct and pass that into a WinRT method. If you need to do this, you have to write additional JavaScript code to explicitly convert your arbitrary JavaScript object into an array of property name and value pairs or something else that could be represented in WinRT.

However, the other direction you can do. An instance of a Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet implementation in WinRT is projected into JavaScript as a JavaScript object with property names and values corresponding to the key and value pairs in the IPropertySet. In this way you can project a WinRT object as a JavaScript object with arbitrary property names and types. But again, the reverse is not possible. Chakra will not convert an arbitrary JavaScript object into an IPropertySet.

// C# WinRT component
        public sealed class PropertySetContainer
        {
            private Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet otherValue = null;

            public Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet other
            {
                get
                {
                    return otherValue;
                }
                set
                {
                    otherValue = value;
                }
            }
        }

        public sealed class PropertySet : Windows.Foundation.Collections.IPropertySet
        {
            private IDictionary map = new Dictionary();

            public PropertySet()
            {
                map.Add("abc", "def");
                map.Add("ghi", "jkl");
                map.Add("mno", "pqr");
            }
            // ... rest of PropertySet implementation is simple wrapper around the map member.
            

// JS code
    var propertySet = new ExampleWinRTComponent.ExampleNamespace.PropertySet();
    console.log("propertySet: " + JSON.stringify(propertySet));
    // propertySet: {"abc":"def","ghi":"jkl","mno":"pqr"}

    var propertySetContainer = new ExampleWinRTComponent.ExampleNamespace.PropertySetContainer();
    propertySetContainer.other = propertySet;
    console.log("propertySetContainer.other: " + JSON.stringify(propertySetContainer.other));
    // propertySetContainer.other: {"abc":"def","ghi":"jkl","mno":"pqr"}

    try {
        propertySetContainer.other = { "123": "456", "789": "012" };
    }
    catch (e) {
        console.error("Error setting propertySetContainer.other: " + e);
        // Error setting propertySetContainer.other: TypeError: Type mismatch
}

There’s also no way to implicitly convert a DOM object into a WinRT type. If you want to write third party WinRT code that interacts with the DOM, you must do so indirectly and explicitly in JavaScript code that is interacting with your third party WinRT. You’ll have to extract the information you want from your DOM objects to pass into WinRT methods and similarly have to pass messages out from WinRT that say what actions the JavaScript should perform on the DOM.

• The location object's search, hash, and protocol properties are all misnomers that lead to confusion about the correct terms:
  • The 'search' property returns the URI's query property. The query property isn't limited to containing search terms.
  • The 'hash' property returns the URI's fragment property. This one is just named after its delimiter. It should be called the fragment.
  • The 'protocol' property returns the URI's scheme property. A URI's scheme isn't necessarily a protocol. The http URI scheme of course uses the HTTP protocol, but the https URI scheme is the HTTP protocol over SSL/TLS - there is no HTTPS protocol. Similarly for something like mailto - there is no mailto wire protocol.
• The 'hash' and 'search' location properties both return null in the case that their corresponding URI property doesn't exist or if its the empty string. A URI with no query property and a URI with an empty string query property that are otherwise the same, are not equal URIs and are allowed by HTTP to return different content. Similarly for the fragment. Unless the specific URI scheme defines otherwise, an empty query or hash isn't the same as no query or hash.

Param([Parameter(Mandatory=$true)][string]$Path);

$excel = New-Object -ComObject Excel.Application

$xlWindows=2
$xlDelimited=1 # 1 = delimited, 2 = fixed width
$xlTextQualifierDoubleQuote=1 # 1= doublt quote, -4142 = no delim, 2 = single quote
$consequitiveDelim = $False;
$tabDelim = $False;
$semicolonDelim = $False;
$commaDelim = $True;
$StartRow=1
$Semicolon=$True

$excel.visible=$true
$excel.workbooks.OpenText($Path,$xlWindows,$StartRow,$xlDelimited,$xlTextQualifierDoubleQuote,$consequitiveDelim,$tabDelim,$semicolonDelim, $commaDelim);

My first app for Windows 8 was Shout Text. You type into Shout Text, and your text is scaled up as large as possible while still fitting on the screen, as you type. It is the closest thing to a Hello World app as you'll find on the Windows Store that doesn't contain that phrase (by default) and I approached it as the simplest app I could make to learn about Windows modern app development and Windows Store app submission.

I rely on WinJS's default layout to use CSS transforms to scale up the user's text as they type. And they are typing into a simple content editable div.

The app was too simple for me to even consider using ads or charging for it which I learned more about in future apps.

The first interesting issue I ran into was that copying from and then pasting into the content editable div resulted in duplicates of the containing div with copied CSS appearing recursively inside of the content editable div. To fix this I had to catch the paste operation and remove the HTML data from the clipboard to ensure only the plain text data is pasted:

        function onPaste() {
            var text;

            if (window.clipboardData) {
                text = window.clipboardData.getData("Text").toString();
                window.clipboardData.clearData("Html");
                window.clipboardData.setData("Text", util.normalizeContentEditableText(text));
            }
        }
        shoutText.addEventListener("beforepaste", function () { return false; }, false);
        shoutText.addEventListener("paste", onPaste, false);

I additionally found an issue in IE in which applying a CSS transform to a content editable div that has focus doesn't move the screen position of the user input caret - the text is scaled up or down but the caret remains the same size and in the same place on the screen. To fix this I made the following hack to reapply the current cursor position and text selection which resets the screen position of the user input caret.

        function resetCaret() {
            setTimeout(function () {
                var cursorPos = document.selection.createRange().duplicate();
                cursorPos.select();
            }, 200);
        }

        shoutText.attachEvent("onresize", function () { resetCaret(); }, true);

Level 4 and level 6 of the Stripe CTF had solutions around XSS.

Level 4

Code

> Registered Users 

<%@registered_users.each do |user| %>
<%last_active = user[:last_active].strftime('%H:%M:%S UTC') %>
<%if @trusts_me.include?(user[:username]) %>

• 
<%= user[:username] %>
(password: <%= user[:password] %>, last active <%= last_active %>)


Issue

The level 4 web application lets you transfer karma to another user and in doing so you are also forced to expose your password to that user. The main user page displays a list of users who have transfered karma to you along with their password. The password is not HTML encoded so we can inject HTML into that user's browser. For instance, we could create an account with the following HTML as the password which will result in XSS with that HTML:

This HTML runs script that uses jQuery to post to the transfer URI resulting in a transfer of karma from the attacked user to the attacker user, and also the attacked user's password.

Notes

Code review red flags in this case included lack of encoding when using user controlled content to create HTML content, storing passwords in plain text in the database, and displaying passwords generally. By design the web app shows users passwords which is a very bad idea.

Level 6

Code

...

    def self.safe_insert(table, key_values)
      key_values.each do |key, value|
        # Just in case people try to exfiltrate
        # level07-password-holder's password
        if value.kind_of?(String) &&
            (value.include?('"') || value.include?("'"))
          raise "Value has unsafe characters"
        end
      end

      conn[table].insert(key_values)
    end

Issue

This web app does a much better job than the level 4 app with HTML injection. They use encoding whenever creating HTML using user controlled data, however they don't use encoding when injecting JSON data into script (see post_data initialization above). This JSON data is the last five most recent messages sent on the app so we get to inject script directly. However, the system also ensures that no strings we write contains single or double quotes so we can't get out of the string in the JSON data directly. As it turns out, HTML lets you jump out of a script block using no matter where you are in script. For instance, in the middle of a value in some JSON data we can jump out of script. But we still want to run script, so we can jump right back in. So the frame so far for the message we're going to post is the following:

Stripe's web security CTF's Level 1 and level 2 of the Stripe CTF had issues with missing input validation solutions described below.

Level 1

Code

          $filename = 'secret-combination.txt';
      extract($_GET);
      if (isset($attempt)) {
        $combination = trim(file_get_contents($filename));
        if ($attempt === $combination) {

Issue

The issue here is the usage of the extract php method which extracts name value pairs from the map input parameter and creates corresponding local variables. However this code uses $_GET which contains a map of name value pairs passed in the query of the URI. The expected behavior is to get an attempt variable out, but since no input validation is done I can provide a filename variable and overwrite the value of $filename. Providing an empty string gives an empty string $combination which I can match with an empty string $attempt. So without knowing the combination I can get past the combination check.

Notes

Code review red flag in this case was the direct use of $_GET with no validation. Instead of using extract the developer could try to extract specifically the attempt variable manually without using extract.

Level 2

Code

    $dest_dir = "uploads/";
    $dest = $dest_dir . basename($_FILES["dispic"]["name"]);
    $src = $_FILES["dispic"]["tmp_name"];
    if (move_uploaded_file($src, $dest)) {
      $_SESSION["dispic_url"] = $dest;
      chmod($dest, 0644);
      echo "
Successfully uploaded your display picture.
";
    }

Issue

This code accepts POST uploads of images but with no validation to ensure it is not an arbitrary file. And even though it uses chmod to ensure the file is not executable, things like PHP don't require a file to be executable in order to run them. Accordingly, one can upload a PHP script, then navigate to that script to run it. My PHP script dumped out the contents of the file we're interested in for this level:

Notes

Code review red flags include manual file management, chmod, and use of file and filename inputs without any kind of validation. If this code controlled the filename and ensured that the extension was one of a set of image extensions, this would solve this issue. Due to browser mime sniffing its additionally a good idea to serve a content-type that starts with "image/" for these uploads to ensure browsers treat these as images and not sniff for script or HTML.

Stripe's web security CTF's level 0 and level 3 had SQL injection solutions described below.

Level 0

Code

app.get('/*', function(req, res) {
  var namespace = req.param('namespace');

  if (namespace) {
    var query = 'SELECT * FROM secrets WHERE key LIKE ? || ".%"';
    db.all(query, namespace, function(err, secrets) {

Issue

There's no input validation on the namespace parameter and it is injected into the SQL query with no encoding applied. This means you can use the '%' character as the namespace which is the wildcard character matching all secrets.

Notes

Code review red flag was using strings to query the database. Additional levels made this harder to exploit by using an API with objects to construct a query rather than strings and by running a query that only returned a single row, only ran a single command, and didn't just dump out the results of the query to the caller.

Level 3

Code

@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
def login():
    username = flask.request.form.get('username')
    password = flask.request.form.get('password')

    if not username:
        return "Must provide username\n"

    if not password:
        return "Must provide password\n"

    conn = sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(data_dir, 'users.db'))
    cursor = conn.cursor()

    query = """SELECT id, password_hash, salt FROM users
               WHERE username = '{0}' LIMIT 1""".format(username)
    cursor.execute(query)

    res = cursor.fetchone()
    if not res:
        return "There's no such user {0}!\n".format(username)
    user_id, password_hash, salt = res

    calculated_hash = hashlib.sha256(password + salt)
    if calculated_hash.hexdigest() != password_hash:
        return "That's not the password for {0}!\n".format(username)

Issue

There's little input validation on username before it is used to constrcut a SQL query. There's no encoding applied when constructing the SQL query string which is used to, given a username, produce the hashed password and the associated salt. Accordingly one can make username a part of a SQL query command which ensures the original select returns nothing and provide a new SELECT via a UNION that returns some literal values for the hash and salt. For instance the following in blue is the query template and the red is the username injected SQL code:

SELECT id, password_hash, salt FROM users WHERE username = 'doesntexist' UNION SELECT id, ('5e884898da28047151d0e56f8dc6292773603d0d6aabbdd62a11ef721d1542d8') AS password_hash, ('word') AS salt FROM users WHERE username = 'bob' LIMIT 1

Notes

Code review red flag is again using strings to query the database. Although this level was made more difficult by using an API that returns only a single row and by using the execute method which only runs one command. I was forced to (as a SQL noob) learn the syntax of SELECT in order to figure out UNION and how to return my own literal values.

I was the 546th person to complete Stripe's web security CTF and again had a ton of fun applying my theoretical knowledge of web security issues to the (semi-)real world. As I went through the levels I thought about what red flags jumped out at me (or should have) that I could apply to future code reviews:

More about each level in the future.