xss - Dave's Blog


Tweet from emma jane

2016 Dec 2, 2:07
XSS: the game http://buff.ly/2gGghdI 

Retweet of securinti

2016 Feb 4, 6:11
[WRITE-UP] A tale of two offline @google Chrome UXSS vulns!http://ceukelai.re/a-tale-of-two-offline-chrome-uxss-vulns/ … pic.twitter.com/USZmlbVy2M

Retweet of soaj1664ashar

2015 Dec 5, 12:52
[Blogged]: The Dark Side of Comments: https://respectxss.blogspot.de/2015/12/the-dark-side-of-comments.html … #XSS #comments

Retweet of olemoudi

2015 Sep 18, 4:21
Shell-XSS: Never trust cat again http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/09/17/5 …

Tweet from David_Risney

2015 Aug 4, 3:08
Very helpful site to determine which channels you're likely able to receive OTA based on your address or zip code: http://gomohu.com/xbox/ 

Tweet from David_Risney

2015 Jul 20, 10:21
There is no cloud, just other people's cars. https://twitter.com/XSSniper/status/623523334727188480 …

Retweet of troyhunt

2015 Jul 13, 10:43
Blogged: How I got XSS’d by my ad network http://ift.tt/1HsCP4K 

Tweet from David_Risney

2015 Mar 30, 10:52
Or from GitHub's POV, how else can you use this XSS? Example: Open a new window with info on howto subvert particular censorship. What else?

Tweet from David_Risney

2015 Mar 29, 11:01
Faust: I want to XSS everyone! Devil: Sign here… Faust: Oh no, GitHub server's can't handle the traffic! ♪ Twilight zone theme ♪

XSS game

2014 May 29, 1:10

Google’s XSS training game. Learn how to find XSS issues for fun and profit.

PermalinkCommentstechnical web security xss google

Stripe CTF - XSS, CSRF (Levels 4 & 6)

2012 Sep 10, 4:43

Level 4 and level 6 of the Stripe CTF had solutions around XSS.

Level 4


> Registered Users 

  • <% @registered_users.each do |user| %>
    <% last_active = user[:last_active].strftime('%H:%M:%S UTC') %>
    <% if @trusts_me.include?(user[:username]) %>

  • <%= user[:username] %>
    (password: <%= user[:password] %>, last active <%= last_active %>)
  • Issue

    The level 4 web application lets you transfer karma to another user and in doing so you are also forced to expose your password to that user. The main user page displays a list of users who have transfered karma to you along with their password. The password is not HTML encoded so we can inject HTML into that user's browser. For instance, we could create an account with the following HTML as the password which will result in XSS with that HTML:

    This HTML runs script that uses jQuery to post to the transfer URI resulting in a transfer of karma from the attacked user to the attacker user, and also the attacked user's password.


    Code review red flags in this case included lack of encoding when using user controlled content to create HTML content, storing passwords in plain text in the database, and displaying passwords generally. By design the web app shows users passwords which is a very bad idea.

    Level 6



    def self.safe_insert(table, key_values)
    key_values.each do |key, value|
    # Just in case people try to exfiltrate
    # level07-password-holder's password
    if value.kind_of?(String) &&
    (value.include?('"') || value.include?("'"))
    raise "Value has unsafe characters"



    This web app does a much better job than the level 4 app with HTML injection. They use encoding whenever creating HTML using user controlled data, however they don't use encoding when injecting JSON data into script (see post_data initialization above). This JSON data is the last five most recent messages sent on the app so we get to inject script directly. However, the system also ensures that no strings we write contains single or double quotes so we can't get out of the string in the JSON data directly. As it turns out, HTML lets you jump out of a script block using no matter where you are in script. For instance, in the middle of a value in some JSON data we can jump out of script. But we still want to run script, so we can jump right back in. So the frame so far for the message we're going to post is the following:

PermalinkCommentscsrf encoding html internet javascript percent-encoding script security stripe-ctf technical web xss

Stripe Web Security CTF Summary

2012 Aug 30, 5:00

I was the 546th person to complete Stripe's web security CTF and again had a ton of fun applying my theoretical knowledge of web security issues to the (semi-)real world. As I went through the levels I thought about what red flags jumped out at me (or should have) that I could apply to future code reviews:

Level Issue Code Review Red Flags
0 Simple SQL injection No encoding when constructing SQL command strings. Constructing SQL command strings instead of SQL API
1 extract($_GET); No input validation.
2 Arbitrary PHP execution No input validation. Allow file uploads. File permissions modification.
3 Advanced SQL injection Constructing SQL command strings instead of SQL API.
4 HTML injection, XSS and CSRF No encoding when constructing HTML. No CSRF counter measures. Passwords stored in plain text. Password displayed on site.
5 Pingback server doesn't need to opt-in n/a - By design protocol issue.
6 Script injection and XSS No encoding while constructing script. Deny list (of dangerous characters). Passwords stored in plain text. Password displayed on site.
7 Length extension attack Custom crypto code. Constructing SQL command string instead of SQL API.
8 Side channel attack Password handling code. Timing attack mitigation too clever.

More about each level in the future.

PermalinkCommentscode-review coding csrf html internet programming script security sql stripe technical web xss

SkullSecurity » Blog Archive » Stuffing Javascript into DNS names

2012 Aug 27, 4:25

dnsxss tool helps you inject via DNS

…what it does is, essentially, respond to DNS requests for CNAME, MX, TXT, and NS records with Javascript code. … how about SQL injection?

PermalinkCommentssecurity technical javascript dns sql

Web Security Contest - Stripe CTF

2012 Aug 27, 4:18

Stripe is running a web security capture the flag - a series of increasingly difficult web security exploit challenges. I've finished it and had a lot of fun. Working on a web browser I knew the theory of these various web based attacks, but this was my first chance to put theory into practice with:

  • No adverse consequences
  • Knowledge that there is a fun security exploit to find
  • Access to the server side source code

Here's a blog post on the CTF behind the scenes setup which has many impressive features including phantom users that can be XSS/CSRF'ed.

I'll have another post on my difficulties and answers for the CTF levels after the contest is over on Wed, but if you're looking for hints, try out the CTF chatroom or the level specific CTF chatroom.

PermalinkCommentscontest security technical

A Tale Of Two Pwnies (Part 2)

2012 Jun 11, 6:39

Summary of one of the Chrome security exploits from pwn2own.  Basically XSS into the chrome URI scheme which gives access to special APIs.

PermalinkCommentstechnical browser web-browser security xss

Client-side Cross-domain Security

2010 Mar 31, 7:54"Summary: Exploring cross-domain threats and use cases, security principles for cross-origin requests, and finally, weighing the risks for developers to enhance cross-domain access from web applications running in the browser."PermalinkCommentstechnical msdn microsoft security xss XMLHttpRequest web browser

Part2 - browsersec - Browser Security Handbook, part 2 - Project Hosting on Google Code

2010 Mar 10, 5:19Covers same origin policy and how it applies to different HTML and HTTP features.PermalinkCommentstechnical web browser javascript csrf ajax html security xss XMLHttpRequest

Chromium Blog: Security in Depth: New Security Features

2010 Jan 27, 9:56Some of the new security features in Chrome: XSS filter, HTTPS only, HTML5 origin header, and HTML5 postMessage function.PermalinkCommentshtml5 html script xss csrf chrome browser google security web technical

Making browsers faster: Resource Packages · Alexander Limi

2009 Nov 17, 6:52"What if there was a backwards compatible way to transfer all of the resources that are used on every single page in your site — CSS, JS, images, anything else — in a single HTTP request at the start of the first visit to the page? This is what Resource Package support in browsers will let you do." Another resource packaging implementation but this suggests they'll actually implement this in FireFox. One issue with all of these is you can't use the resources from the package in any context that didn't ask to use the package for fear of security issues which means you can't stick the packaged resources in your HTTP cache. The package itself could go in the cache which would mean multiple packages per page or all your page's resources in one package. Of course the same security issues are a concern for all of the packaging proposals if a site has any way to inject into the source the request for the package. It'd be a similar vector to the UTF7 XSS issues but much worse attack.PermalinkCommentssecurity web browser http zip firefox resource technical via:kris.kowal

Secure Content Sniffing for Web Browsers or How to Stop Papers from Reviewing Themselves

2009 Apr 23, 2:22Review of mime sniffing based XSS attacks with recommended protections for both web sites and browsers. Also, surprising to me since I rarely see it in this sort of a paper, thought and stats on the compat. affects of their recommended changes for browsers. Very happy to see that in there!PermalinkCommentsweb security ie browser xss sniff mime firefox chrome safari html html5
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